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Rights, Remedies and Facial Challenges
by MAYA MANIAN*
In a few short years, the Roberts Court has managed to severely
restrict the use of facial challenges across substantive areas of
constitutional law.1  Caitlin Borgmann's article, Holding Legislatures
Constitutionally Accountable Through Facial Challenges,2 provides a
compelling analysis of the vexing distinction between as-applied and facial
challenges in constitutional litigation and the impact that limiting facial
challenges has on constitutional rights. Borgmann argues that facial
challenges are necessary to keep legislatures in check, particularly when
legislatures "deliberately or recklessly infringe individual rights" of those
who lack political power. 3 Facial challenges are needed in this context not
only to protect important individual rights, but also to ensure that
legislatures do not unfairly shift their constitutional responsibilities to the
courts.4 Legislatures have in the past skirted their constitutional duties by
passing blatantly unconstitutional laws in order to pander to public
sentiment, "leav[ing] the courts to do their dirty work" of conforming the
legislation to the Constitution.
5
Borgmann's article makes several significant contributions to the
scholarship on as-applied and facial challenges. First, Borgmann provides
a useful taxonomy to describe the various ways in which a "facial" versus
an "as-applied" challenge can be presented. It has been difficult to
distinguish as-applied from facial challenges due to the lack of clarity
* Associate Professor, University of San Francisco School of Law. I thank Susan
Freiwald, Peter Honigsberg, Julie Nice and Steve Shatz for helpful comments on earlier drafts.
Thanks to Alexandria Walden for research assistance. Thanks also to Roy Sehgal for useful
feedback.
1. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007); Wash. St. Grange v. Wash. State
Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184 (2008); Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct.
1610 (2008).
2. Caitlin Borgmann, Holding Legislatures Constitutionally Accountable Through Facial
Challenges, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 563 (2009).
3. Id. at 564.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 567.
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regarding what these terms mean. Courts and commentators have confused
as-applied and facial challenges with whether a suit is brought pre-
enforcement or post-enforcement; have used different terminology
depending on whether the challenge will lead to complete invalidation or
partial invalidation of a law; and have failed to distinguish between the
type of challenge at issue as opposed to the remedy provided by the court.6
Borgmann categorizes the types of challenges litigants can bring first by
whether the challenge is "pre-enforcement" or "post-enforcement., 7 Pre-
enforcement challenges can seek: (1) total invalidation of a law, which is
the paradigmatic case of a "facial" challenge; (2) limited invalidation of a
law to a subset of applications, which is variously described as either an
"as-applied" or a "facial" challenge; and (3) case-specific invalidation
where a party asserts that the law is unconstitutional solely as applied to
her, which is the typical understanding of an "as-applied" challenge.8
However, all pre-enforcement challenges are in some sense "facial"
challenges since the statute has never been applied and, given the lack of
facts regarding enforcement, the statute is measured solely on its face, i.e.,
by its text alone. 9 Similarly, post-enforcement challenges can seek total
invalidation, limited invalidation or case-specific invalidation.1°
Moreover, there is an important distinction between the type of
challenge a litigant brings and the type of remedy a court applies, although
courts have frequently confused the two. 11 Borgmann explains that the
above categories refer to the types of challenges litigants may bring. The
remedies granted in response to these challenges "can likewise be (1) total
or full (invalidating the entire statute or provision); (2) partial (invalidating
the statute only as applied to a certain set of applications); [or] (3) case-
specific (invalidating only as applied to the claimant)."' 12 I agree that the
terms "as-applied" and "facial" challenges have no fixed meaning.
Borgmann's detailed categorization of the possible different types of
challenges and remedies shows that the terms "as-applied" and "facial"
challenges are hopelessly muddled and easily manipulable.
Second, although a number of scholars have analyzed the quagmire of
law on as-applied and facial challenges in constitutional litigation,
6. Id. at 569-71.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 570-71.
9. Id.
10. See id. at 570.
11. See infra Part 11.
12. See Borgmann, supra note 2, at 571.
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surprisingly few have considered in detail the impact that the Supreme
Court's preference for as-applied challenges has on underlying
constitutional norms.' 3 The type of challenge permitted tells us nothing
about the underlying right at issue-that is, the Court generally applies the
same procedural rules for allowing facial challenges across doctrinal areas
without considering the effect on the rights at stake. 14 Borgmann brings to
the fore the detrimental impact that hostility to facial challenges has on
courts' ability to protect individual rights. Borgmann describes how the
Roberts Court has been deeply skeptical of facial challenges in numerous
individual rights cases, including those involving abortion rights, voting
rights, political parties' associational rights, and Eighth Amendment rights
related to the death penalty. 5 She argues that a normative agenda drives
the Roberts Court's intolerance of facial challenges and shows that the
Court's justifications for hostility towards facial challenges are pretextual. 6
The Court has often justified restricting the use of facial challenges for two
reasons. First, the Court has asserted that facial invalidation (referring to
total invalidation of a law) is a drastic remedy and principles of separation
13. See id. at 566 n.21 (citing scholarship on facial versus as-applied challenges); see also
David Gans, Strategic Facial Challenges, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1333 (2005); Gillian E. Metzger,
Facial Challenges and Federalism, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 873 (2005); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-
Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 HARv. L. REV. 1321 (2000);
Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules: The Moral Structure of American Constitutional Law,
97 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1998); Marc E. Isserles, Overcoming Overbreadth: Facial Challenges and
the Valid Rule Requirement, 48 AM. U.L. REV. 359 (1998); Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges
to State and Federal Statutes, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 235 (1994).
14. See Borgmann, supra note 2, at 569-71. There are two notable exceptions to this: First
Amendment overbreadth and, until recently, abortion. First, the Court itself acknowledged that
overbreadth doctrine is an exception to its general rule that "facial" challenges, i.e., total
invalidation, should only be "entertained" when "the challenger ... establish[es] that no set of
circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid." United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S.
739, 745 (1987) (noting that overbreadth cases permit facial challenges even if the regulation
could constitutionally apply to the challenger herself). The Salerno "no set of circumstances" test
for facial challenges has been heavily criticized. See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 13, at 238-42
(arguing that the Salerno standard is incorrect as a matter of principle and practice). Second, in
Planned Parenthood ofSe. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 895 (1992), the Court allowed a facial
challenge to an abortion restriction where the regulation presented an "undue burden" to a "large
fraction" of women to whom the restriction was relevant. Recently, in Gonzales v. Carhart, the
Court appeared to retreat from Casey's more permissive standard towards allowing facial
challenges to abortion restrictions, although Carhart explicitly refused to resolve the conflict
between the Salerno and Casey standards for reviewing facial challenges. See Gonzales v.
Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1639 (2007) (noting confusion among courts whether Salerno or Casey
standard applies to facial challenges in abortion context, but concluding that the Court "need not
resolve that debate").
15. See Borgmann, supra note 2, at 574-88.
16. Id. at 588-89.
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of powers and federalism suggest limiting its use. Second, the Court
claims that proper adjudication requires concrete facts, which pre-
enforcement facial challenges typically lack. Borgmann convincingly
demonstrates that, thus far, the Roberts Court has not been consistently
committed to these rationales, particularly the supposed concern for
concrete facts. Borgmann argues, persuasively, that the Court's approach
to as-applied and facial challenges varies based on its normative
assessment of the rights at issue, rather than a neutral approach based on
purely procedural concerns.17
Third, Borgmann examines not only how hostility to facial challenges
threatens substantive constitutional rights, but also how limiting facial
challenges upsets the balance of power between legislatures and the courts.
Borgmann asserts that more stringent judicial review of legislative purpose
and of the legislature's factual foundations for regulations that infringe
civil rights will help to determine when courts should totally invalidate a
law "on its face" in order to ensure that legislatures do not shirk their
constitutional duties.' 8  Ultimately, "'facial challenges' offer a way of
encouraging legislative constitutional accountability."' 19
This brief Comment attempts to build upon just one key point raised
by Borgmann: that favoring one mode of constitutional litigation-facial or
as-applied-has direct implications for substantive constitutional norms.
More specifically, I want to comment further on Borgmann's claim that the
Roberts Court's intolerance of facial challenges "permits the Court to
withdraw from its critical role in safeguarding individual rights.
20
Borgmann reveals inconsistencies in the Roberts Court's analysis of facial
challenges and persuades that these inconsistencies expose the Court's
outcome-driven approach to facial challenges.21 Where the Court is
unsympathetic towards the underlying right, the Court is also
unsympathetic towards a facial challenge and vice-versa. 2 I would further
17. Id. at 588-90, 597-98.
18. Id. at 598-610.
19. Id. at 600.
20. Id. at 564.
21. Id. at 588-90.
22. Id. at 589; see also Warshak v. United States, 532 F.3d 521, 538 (2008) (Martin, J.,
dissenting). The dissenting judge in Warshak noted that the Roberts Court does favor facial
challenges if it favors the underlying right, such as the Second Amendment right to bear arms. Id.
("The majority makes much of the fact that facial challenges are no way to litigate the
constitutional validity of certain laws. Yet our Supreme Court has no problem striking down a
handgun ban enacted by a democratically elected city government on a facial basis. History tells
us that it is not the fact that a constitutional right is at issue that portends the outcome of a case,
but rather what specific right we are talking about." (citation omitted)).
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suggest that the Court not only manipulates the law in an outcome-
determinative manner, but also exploits the rules regarding the use of as-
applied and facial challenges as a means to rewrite substantive law without
having to openly overrule prior precedent. I also argue that this particular
method of using seemingly procedural rules to alter-usually
detrimentally-substantive rights is part of a larger pattern on the Roberts
Court. Across different areas of law, the Roberts Court has tended to
"close the courthouse doors" to individual rights claimants by manipulating
seemingly technical rules and thereby obscuring its rollback of individual
rights.23
Borgmann's insightful analysis also raises a critical question: in the
face of the Roberts Court's hostility towards facial challenges, how should
civil rights litigants frame their cases to better protect fundamental
constitutional rights? I suggest that one possibility might be for civil rights
advocates to avail themselves of the confusion surrounding the distinction
between as-applied and facial challenges, and reframe their "facial"
challenges as requests for a remedy that would apply to a broad subset of
persons impacted by the rights-infringing law being challenged.
I. About Face-Rewriting Abortion Law
On at least two occasions, the Roberts Court has rewritten substantive
law under the guise of making merely procedural choices between as-
applied or facial challenges.2 4 One of the most prominent examples of the
Court's about face on facial challenges, Gonzales v. Carhart, illustrates the
Court's use of litigation posture to cloak its overruling of precedent.2 5
Carhart upheld the federal "partial-birth" abortion ban, which bans a
method of pre-viability second-trimester abortion that many physicians
have concluded must be used in some cases to protect their patients'
health.26 The federal abortion ban denies women a health exception,
although previous Supreme Court decisions have always required a health
23. See Linda Greenhouse, In Steps Big and Small, Supreme Court Moved Right, N.Y.
TIMES, July 1, 2007, at Al (quoting Judith Resnik as labeling the previous Supreme Court term
"the year they closed the courts" due to series of cases limiting ability of plaintiffs to bring
lawsuits).
24. See FEC v. Wis. Right To Life (WRTL II), 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2684 n.7 (2007) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (stating that WRTL II "effectively overrules McConnell without
saying so"); Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007).
25. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610.
26. See id. "Partial-birth" abortion is a political term, not a medical term. See Cynthia
Gomey, Gambling with Abortion: Why Both Sides Think They Have Everything to Lose,
HARPER'S, Nov. 2004, at 33.
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exception to abortion restrictions. 27  As Borgmann explains, Carhart
proclaimed that facial challenges should never have been "entertained" by
the Court in the abortion context.28 Instead, the Court offered the promise
of future "as-applied" challenges as "the proper manner to protect the
health of the woman., 29 It is impossible to reconcile the Court's refusal to
invalidate an abortion restriction lacking a health exception, or to at least
partially invalidate such a restriction, with prior case law. 30  I agree with
Borgmann's claim that the Court's promise of future "as-applied"
challenges in the abortion context is illusory and more likely reflects the
Court's hostility to abortion rights. I would also argue that the majority
used the debate surrounding the appropriate use of facial challenges as a
means to rewrite substantive law sub rosa. Carhart overruled well-
established precedent by essentially writing the requirement of a health
exception to abortion restrictions out of the law. The manipulation of the
as-applied and facial challenge approaches to constitutional litigation
presented a way for the Court to reject the health exception rule without
explicitly saying so.
31
Since the Roe v. Wade decision, the Court has always required that
abortion regulations contain health exceptions, even for post-viability
abortions. 32 Although Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania
v. Casey altered aspects of the Roe regime for protecting abortion rights,
Casey reiterated that both pre- and post-viability abortion restrictions must
contain health exceptions.33 In Stenberg v. Carhart, the first Supreme
27. See cases and sourced cited infra notes 32-44 and accompanying text.
28. See Borgmann, supra note 2, at 580-81.
29. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1638-39.
30. See Borgmann, supra note 2, at 580-81; David Franklin, Looking Through Both Ends of
the Telescope: Facial Challenges and the Roberts Court, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 689, 703
(2009).
3 1. Anti-abortion groups have long advocated for eliminating the health exception. Brief for
NARAL Pro-Choice America Foundation as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs, Planned
Parenthood of N. New Eng. v. Ayotte, 571 F. Supp. 2d 265 (D.N.H. 2006) (No. C-03-491-JD),
2006 WL 4099370 (explaining state legislatures' "refusal to include a health exception [as]
entirely consistent with efforts by national anti-abortion organizations and their nationwide
legislative, litigation, and public relations strategies to eliminate the health exception requirement
from the law."); Judie Brown, The Exception, ALL ABOUT ISSUES, Mar.-Apr. 1992,
http://www.prolife.org.au/articles/abortion anti-abortion-theology/article~l 6.php (last visited
February 27, 2009) (discussing the anti-abortion movement's moral obligation to oppose any
exceptions to restrictive abortion policies); see also Sarah Kliff, 'Health' of the Mother,
NEWSWEEK, Oct. 16, 2008, http://www.newsweek.com/id/164301 (last visited February 27,
2009).
32. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
33. See Planned Parenthood ofSe. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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Court case to address a "partial-birth" abortion ban, the Court again
demanded that abortion restrictions include a health exception.34 The
physicians who challenged each of the abortion restrictions in these cases
(physicians typically have third-party standing in this context to represent
the interests of their women patients) framed the case as a "facial"
challenge-that is, as a pre-enforcement challenge seeking total
invalidation of the law.35 In each case, the Court granted total invalidation
of the challenged abortion restriction.
36
In Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England, the Court
changed its analytical approach, but not the underlying rule requiring a
health exception.37 Ayotte concerned a challenge to a New Hampshire law
prohibiting physicians from providing abortion services to minors until
forty-eight hours after the minor's parents received written notice of the
pending procedure. The New Hampshire Legislature denied a medical
emergency exception to the parental notification requirement." At the
Supreme Court, New Hampshire conceded that it would be unconstitutional
under existing precedent "to apply the Act in a manner that subjects minors
to significant health risks. 39 Justice O'Connor wrote a unanimous opinion
for the Court, a highly unusual configuration in an abortion case.40 Rather
than address the question presented by the case-whether and under what
circumstances the Court should welcome a "facial" challenge in the
abortion context-O'Connor framed the inquiry as one of remedy: "We do
not revisit our abortion precedents today, but rather address a question of
remedy: If enforcing a statute that regulates access to abortion would be
34. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000). Stenberg stated that a health exception
must be included in all abortion restrictions where "substantial medical authority" supports the
need for medical exemptions. See id. at 938. Stenberg invalidated a Nebraska "partial-birth"
abortion ban nearly identical to the federal ban upheld in Carhart. The essential difference
between the two cases was the changed composition of the Court. See Michael C. Dorf,
Nineteenth Annual Supreme Court Review, 23 TOURO L. REV. 815, 818-22 (2008) (arguing that
although Court did not explicitly overrule any abortion precedents, the new majority in Carhart
denied a health exception in contradiction to Stenberg and prior precedents going back to Roe).
35. The Supreme Court has made clear that physicians generally have the right to assert
third-party standing on behalf of their patients seeking abortion. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S.
106, 118 (1976).
36. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 945-46; Casey, 505 U.S. at 898 (striking down spousal
notification provision on its face); Roe, 410 U.S. at 166.
37. Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320 (2006).
38. Id. at 965.
39. Id. at 967.
40. See Borgmann, supra note 2, at 575-76 (stating that the Ayotte approach to facial versus
as-applied challenges served to mask substantive disagreements among the justices and permitted
Justice O'Connor to issue a unanimous decision).
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unconstitutional in medical emergencies, what is the appropriate judicial
response? '41 Notably, O'Connor presented only two remedial options: to
strike down the law in toto for failure to include a health exception or, if
consistent with legislative intent, to craft a more carefully tailored
injunction to preclude enforcement of the law in medical emergencies.
In order to determine the appropriate remedy, the Court remanded to
the lower court directing it to apply the principles of severability articulated
in the opinion.42 Never did the Court suggest that each individual minor
faced with a medical emergency must have her physician file a case-
specific challenge seeking a health exemption. Nor did the Court suggest
that the challengers must begin the litigation all over again with a narrower
class of patients, i.e., the "small percentage" who would require emergency
abortions, and seek a narrow injunctive remedy rather than total
invalidation. 3 By focusing on remedy rather than the standard for
reviewing facial challenges, the Court shifted attention to the question of
who would rewrite the law-either the courts by crafting an injunction with
limited invalidation of the challenged statute or the legislature if the statute
were totally invalidated. Either way, the challengers obtained the relief
they sought-the Court demanded that the abortion restriction contain a
health exception.44
Ayotte presents a striking contrast to Carhart. As noted above,
Carhart broadly rejected the previously accepted use of facial challenges as
the primary method for invalidating unconstitutional abortion restrictions.
In Carhart, the Court ignored extensive factual findings by the lower courts
that substantial medical authority supported the need for a health exception
to the federal abortion ban and deferred the question of whether women
would be harmed by the ban to future "as-applied" challenges.45 Yet the
41. Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 323. The writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court listed one of the
questions presented in Ayotte as whether the courts should apply the Casey or Salerno standard
for facial challenges in the abortion context. See Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng. v. Ayotte,
571 F. Supp. 2d 265, 269-70 (D.N.H. 2008).
42. Id. at 967-69.
43. Id. at 967. Ayotte's approach contrasts starkly with Carhart's approach, discussed infra
notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
44. See Borgmann, supra note 2, at 574-76 (discussing Ayotte); Franklin, supra note 30, at
702 ("So even in Ayotte the facial challenge was in some sense successful: the plaintiffs' sought-
after remedy was narrowed but not denied."); infra Part II for discussion of other implications of
Ayotte's remedy approach. Ultimately, the New Hampshire Legislature repealed the law at issue
in Ayotte and the district court dismissed the case as moot. See Planned Parenthood of N. New
Eng. v. Ayotte, 571 F. Supp. 2d 265 (2008).
45. See Borgmann, supra note 2, at 579-80; see also Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610,
1638 (2007) (stating that women can seek health exceptions "if it can be shown that in discrete
[Vol. 36:4
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Court left utterly vague what type of "as-applied" challenge it
contemplated. If total invalidation of the federal abortion ban seemed too
sweeping to the Court, it could have followed the approach taken in Ayotte
and remanded for consideration of a more limited injunction preventing
enforcement of the federal ban for the "small percentage" of cases
involving medical necessity. 46  Although the challengers to the federal
abortion ban did not frame the case in this manner, Ayotte certainly
provided a workable precedent for the Court to rely upon.4 7
Could Carhart have meant that the challengers should re-litigate the
same case on behalf of a narrower class of women patients suffering from a
health need for the banned procedure? Rather than seek total invalidation
of the federal abortion ban, perhaps these patients could focus on the issue
of a tailored remedy as in Ayotte, i.e., injunctive relief prohibiting
enforcement only in cases of medical need? Unfortunately, Carhart
forecloses success on such a claim. The Carhart Court refused to totally
invalidate the law and force Congress to amend it with a health exception.
Carhart also refused to remand to the lower courts to consider whether
they could properly issue an injunction precluding enforcement in cases of
medical need, the approach suggested by Ayotte.48 The challengers
presented mountains of evidence, reviewed and accepted by three federal
and well-defined instances a particular condition has or is likely to occur in which the procedure
prohibited by the Act must be used").
46. Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 327.
47. See Franklin, supra note 30, at 703 (arguing that Carhart "is impossible to square with
Casey and Ayotte, not to mention Stenberg"). Ayotte distinguished previous precedent allowing
facial challenges, i.e., total invalidation, in the abortion context by blaming the parties for failing
to request narrower relief. See Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 330 (stating that "the parties in Stenberg did
not ask for, and we did not contemplate, relief more finely drawn"). In contrast, by the time the
federal abortion ban came under review, Ayotte provided a clear alternative remedy for
addressing the lack of a health exception in abortion restrictions. See Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v.
Ashcroft, 437 F.3d 278, 290 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding federal abortion ban unconstitutional due to
lack of health exception and remanding for consideration of appropriate remedy in accordance
with Ayotte).
48. See Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1638 ("Considerations of marginal safety, including the
balance of risks, are within the legislative competence when the regulation is rational and in
pursuit of legitimate ends. When standard medical options are available, mere convenience does
not suffice to displace them; and if some procedures have different risks than others, it does not
follow that the State is altogether barred from imposing reasonable regulations."). As in Ayotte,
the Court could have remanded for consideration of limited injunctive relief protecting the health
of women with medical need. See id. at 1651-52 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (questioning why the
Court did not remand for narrower injunction protecting women's health). Carhart fails to
discuss Ayotte as relevant precedent, even though Ayotte clearly suggests employing a tailored
remedy granting injunctive relief for the subset of medical necessity cases. See Kevin C. Walsh,
Frames of Reference and the Turn to Remedy in Facial Challenge Doctrine, 36 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 667, 682-83 (2009).
district courts and three federal appellate courts, demonstrating that women
would need a health exception to the federal abortion ban in particular
medical circumstances.49  For example, the trial courts, after carefully
canvassing the evidence, found that the banned procedure could be
medically necessary for women suffering from "uterine scarring, bleeding
disorders, heart disease, or compromised immune systems., 50  The lower
courts also found that the banned procedure would be safer for women with
health problems caused by the pregnancy, such as "placenta previa and
accreta," and for women carrying fetuses with fatal abnormalities such as
severe hydrocephalus. 51 A second case involving a narrower class of
patients seeking a health exception at the level of the statute (as opposed to
an individualized case-by-case health exception) would merely present
precisely the same evidence, which Carhart already held was insufficient
to require writing a health exception into the law, whether by the courts or
by Congress.52
Perhaps Carhart meant that each individual woman requiring a health
exception must seek individual, case-specific relief on an as-needed basis.
As Borgmann argues, however, this possibility remains unworkable, even
if physicians can bring claims on behalf of their patients to protect
confidentiality.13 In situations of medical emergency, physicians simply
49. See Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1644-45 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing medical
evidence on safety advantages of the banned procedure); see also Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F.
Supp. 2d 805, 924-29, 1024-27 (D. Neb. 2004); Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Ashcroft, 330 F. Supp.
2d 436, 471-74, 480-82 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Ashcroft, 320 F.
Supp. 2d 957, 992-97, 1000-02 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
50. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1645 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing district courts' findings of
fact); see also Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791, 803 (8th Cir. 2005) (concluding that, as in
Stenberg, "substantial medical authority" supports medical necessity of a health exception to
federal abortion ban); Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1163, 1175-76
(9th Cir. 2006) (same); Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 278, 285 (2d Cir. 2006)
(same).
51. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1645 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing district court's findings of
facts).
52. No new evidence on the comparative safety of the banned procedure can now be
developed in the United States since the federal ban criminalizes the procedure nationwide. See
Manuel Porto, A Call for an Evidence-Based Evaluation of Late Midtrimester Abortion, 190 AM.
J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1175-76 (2004) (urging that further studies of available mid-
trimester abortion procedures be undertaken and noting that timeliness of such studies was crucial
given pending decision on federal abortion ban).
53. Borgmann, supra note 2, at 592-93; see also David Faigman, Defining Empirical
Frames of Reference in Constitutional Cases: Unraveling the As-Applied Versus Facial
Distinction in Constitutional Law, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 631, 664 (2009) (arguing that
requiring women to seek case-specific medical exceptions to abortion restrictions places "nearly
insuperable obstacles" to women's right to protect their health).
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could not obtain legal relief on behalf of their patients in sufficient time.54
Even in non-emergency circumstances, the delays that would inevitably
result from a physician's attempt to seek court approval of a health
exception would place the woman's health at increased risk, perhaps even
greater risk than using a less safe method of abortion." The federally
banned abortion procedure would generally only be used in late second-
trimester, pre-viability abortions. 56 Each week of delay in a late second-
trimester abortion significantly increases health risks to the woman and
could cause delay past the point of viability, at which time an abortion can
no longer be performed.57 Particularly in cases where the woman suffers
from a critical illness, medical evidence commands that the abortion
procedure "should be done as early as possible. 58  Moreover, as is
generally true with case-specific challenges, success in one case achieves
little for future, similar cases; each woman burdened by the federal
abortion ban would need her physician to seek an individualized health
exception in advance of her treatment.59
Furthermore, even if it were medically and financially feasible for
physicians to obtain health exceptions on behalf of individual patients
when attempting to safely complete second-trimester abortions, what
54. See Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 328 (2006) (noting
that New Hampshire conceded need for immediate abortions in emergency situations).
55. To my knowledge, no such case-specific as-applied challenges have been filed to the
federal abortion ban.
56. See Stephen T. Chasen et al., Obstetric Outcomes After Surgical Abortion at >20 Weeks'
Gestation, 193 AM. J. OF OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1161-64 (2005) ("intact D&X is usually
done later in pregnancy"); Stephen T. Chasen et al., Dilation and Evacuation at > or =20 Weeks:
Comparison of Operative Techniques, 190 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1180-83 (2004)
(stating that "[p]rocedures performed with intact D&X occurred at later gestational ages").
Carhart held that the federal abortion ban criminalizes the intentional use of only one method of
second-trimester abortion, "intact D&E," but the medical literature labels this same procedure
with various labels: "intact D&E," "intact D&X," or "D&X." See Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1621.
57. See Diana G. Foster et al., Predictors of Delay in Each Step Leading to an Abortion, 77
CONTRACEPTION 289-93 (2008) ("Second-trimester abortions carry an increased incidence of
complications"); Linda A. Bartlett et al., Risk Factors for Legal Induced Abortion-Related
Mortality in the United States, 103 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 729, 731 (2004) ("[T]here is a
38% increase in risk of death for each additional week of gestation.., the increase in the risk of
death due to delaying the procedure by 1 week is much higher at later gestational ages than at
earlier gestational ages."). Viability determinations may vary, but generally a fetus is considered
viable at 24 weeks. See Late-Term Abortions: Legal Considerations, ISSUES IN BRIEF
(Guttmacher Inst., New York, N.Y.), January 1997, at 3, http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/
ib l3.pdf (last visited February 19, 2009).
58. Charles H. Bowers et al., Late-Second-Trimester Pregnancy Termination with Dilation
and Evacuation in Critically Ill Women, 34 J. OF REPROD. MED. 880 (Nov. 1989).
59. See Borgmann, supra note 2, at 592-93.
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exactly would a judge be determining? Case-specific "as-applied" requests
for a health exception present different questions than requests for courts to
determine whether the evidence shows, as a general matter, that
"substantial medical authority" supports the need for a statutory health
exception.60 Normally, we leave to the attending physician's judgment the
determination of what is medically necessary for an individual patient.
6
'
How would a judge know better than the attending physician what an
individual patient's medical needs are, particularly in complicated surgical
contexts? 62  Judges lack the medical training to second-guess a treating
physician's medical judgment. As long as a credible physician backed a
case-specific request for a health exception, the only sane response would
be for the judge to grant the health exemption to the abortion restriction.63
Therefore, if case-specific requests for health exceptions will always be
granted, why require case-specific "as-applied" challenges except as an
60. See Faigman, supra note 53, at 653-54 (describing difference between "reviewable
facts" and "case-specific" facts).
61. For example, compare health exceptions to compulsory vaccination laws. All fifty states
have compulsory vaccination laws and all fifty states provide medical exemptions to those laws.
Some states accept a physician's note confirming medical need for an exemption without
question and some states will conduct a bureaucratic check of the physician's note, but no state
requires individuals to file suit in a court of law to obtain a health exception. See Steve P.
Calandrillo, Vanishing Vaccinations: Why Are So Many Americans Opting Out Of Vaccinating
Their Children?, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 353, 413 (2004) (explaining generally the requirement
of a physician's signature to verify a medical exemption from mandatory immunization); ANGIE
A. WELBORN, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, MANDATORY VACCINATIONS: PRECEDENT
AND CURRENT LAWS, at 3 (Jan. 18, 2005) (discussing Colorado's procedure for medical
exemption as common among most states, which includes "certification from a licensed physician
that 'the physical condition of the student is such that one or more specified immunizations would
endanger his or her life or health or is medically contradicted due to other medical conditions"').
62. See Chasen et al., supra note 56, at 1183 ("[Olur data supports that the most appropriate
technique for surgical evacuation of pregnancy after 20 weeks' gestation should be based on
intraoperative factors. Attempts to regulate intact D&X on the basis of concern for maternal
well-being cannot be supported by available evidence."). Second-trimester abortion surgical
techniques are specialized procedures that require particular knowledge and expertise. For
example, studies show fewer complications resulting from second-trimester abortions when
performed by experienced providers. See David K. Turok et al., Second Trimester Termination of
Pregnancy: A Review by Site and Procedure Type, 77 CONTRACEPTION 155-61 (2008)
(concluding that lack of experience likely contributed to higher complication rate in comparison
of second-trimester abortion procedures conducted in high and low volume settings).
63. There are very few second-trimester abortion providers left in the United States. See
Turok, et al., supra note 62, at 155-61 (noting lack of experienced second-trimester providers).
Because second-trimester abortion procedures present greater risk of complications, the few
providers remaining tend to be physicians at hospitals or specialized clinics who are likely to be
credible authority.
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insurmountable hurdle to women seeking a health exception? 64  The
conclusion seems inescapable that the Court simply wanted to preclude any
kind of a health exception to the federal abortion ban. In other words, the
Court wrote the requirement of a health exception out of the law.
I believe we will likely never resolve how a judge should assess a
request for an individual health exception to the federal abortion ban,
because most, if not all, women will be unable to seek case-specific health
exceptions and instead will be forced to jeopardize their health.65 There is
no right to a health exception if the remedy is unattainable in reality. By
refraining the issue as one of altered litigation posture rather than openly
overruling substantive doctrine, Carhart muddles what is in fact a
significant rewriting of abortion law. Carhart diminished women's
substantive right to choose abortion by overruling the long-held right to
health exemptions from abortion restrictions.66 The promise of future "as-
applied" challenges to the federal abortion ban is pure illusion. As Justice
Scalia stated in another Roberts Court case in which the Court overruled
precedent under cover of the "as-applied" frame: "This faux judicial
restraint is judicial obfuscation. 67
Carhart's legalistic maneuver-manipulating procedural rules to
achieve substantive results-is not a new method for the Roberts Court. I
suspect that this is part of a pattern, and will continue to be a pattern, across
different doctrinal areas. Two recent examples illustrate the Roberts
64. Another way of viewing the same question is why not grant at least limited injunctive
relief, providing a health exception to the federal abortion ban "as-applied" to all women with
medical need, if ultimately the only reasonable option would be for judges to leave these
decisions to the treating physicians and their patients anyway? Requiring case-by-case
adjudication of health exceptions is in and of itself an "undue burden." See Faigman, supra note
53, at 663-64 (arguing that barriers associated with bringing case-specific challenge is a
"substantial obstacle" to exercise of the right to health exception).
65. Studies show that women seeking second-trimester abortions are typically very poor,
very young or very sick. Even if it were medically feasible, these women are not likely to have
the financial resources to litigate an "as-applied" case-specific request for a health exception. See
Diana G. Foster et al., Predictors of Delay in Each Step Leading to an Abortion, 77
CONTRACEPTION 289-93 (2008) (finding lack of financial resources to be one significant factor
leading to second-trimester abortion); Phillip G. Stubblefield et al., Methods for Induced
Abortion, 104 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 174, 179 (2004) (noting that women seeking second
trimester abortion are medically "a very important group, including virtually all patients who
have antenatal diagnosis of congenital anomalies, many women with serious illness, and a
disproportionate share of very young women").
66. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
67. See FEC v. Wis. Right to Life (WRTL I1), 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2684 n.7 (2007) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (stating that WRTL 11 "effectively overrules McConnell without
saying so"); Franklin, supra note 30, at 706-08 (discussing WRTL 1I and arguing that court
overturned prior precedent in guise of as-applied challenge).
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Court's rollback of individual rights disguised as technical interpretations
of procedural rules, although not in the "as-applied" and "facial" challenge
context.
First, in Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc., the Court
rejected an Establishment Clause challenge to President George W. Bush's
"Faith-Based and Community Initiatives" program, deploying standing
doctrine as an impediment to the protection of individual rights.68 In Hein,
the challengers asserted that an executive office program directed federal
funds to religious organizations in violation of the Establishment Clause.6 9
Although taxpayers generally do not have standing to challenge
government expenditures, prior precedent, Flast v. Cohen, created an
important exception to this rule to allow taxpayer standing if government
spending contravenes the Establishment Clause.7° Without such an
exception to the restriction on taxpayer standing, the right guaranteed by
the Establishment Clause would essentially have no remedy in many
cases.71 Although Hein involved spending by the executive rather than the
congressional spending at issue in Flast, the Seventh Circuit, in an opinion
by Judge Richard Posner, held that the Flast exception must still apply.72
Otherwise, the executive would be free to violate the Establishment Clause
with impunity.
73
The Roberts Court rejected the lower court's position, but not by
overruling Flast and openly declaring that government could tax and spend
for religious purposes as Justice Scalia was wont to do.74 Instead, Justice
Alito's plurality opinion drew some rather fine distinctions, holding that
68. Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found,, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007).
69. See id. at 2559.
70. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
71. See, e.g., Carl H. Esbeck, What the Hein Decision Can Tell Us About the Roberts Court
and the Establishment Clause, 78 Miss. L.J. 199, 212 (2008) (stating that Flast exception is
necessary to guarantee the right protected by the Establishment Clause). It is possible that an
individual with a more direct injury resulting from the government's religiously based spending
could establish standing to challenge the spending, but such a plaintiff will likely be harder to
find in many situations. See Ira C. Lupu et al., Ball on a Needle: Hein v. Freedom from Religion
Foundation, Inc. and The Future of Establishment Clause Adjudication, 2008 B.Y.U. L. REV.
115, 116-19 (2008) (discussing the fate of various pending cases that involved taxpayer standing
in the immediate aftermath of Hein).
72. See Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. Chao, 433 F.3d 989, 994-97 (7th Cir. 2006).
73. See id. at 995 ("If the conferences at issue in this case are, as the plaintiffs charge,
intended to promote religion, the fact that their cost is slight relative to the budgets of the various
departments that sponsor them does not make that cost incidental. Otherwise, indeed, there
would be no federal taxpayer standing in any case.").
74. See Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2584 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (criticizing plurality
opinion and arguing that "Flast should be overruled.")
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executive spending differed from congressional spending such that the
Flast exception should not apply and taxpayer standing should be denied.75
Justice Scalia, who agreed with the result in the case, nevertheless
scathingly attacked the plurality's reasoning, arguing that its approach
"creat[ed] utterly meaningless distinctions which separate the case at hand
from the precedents that have come out differently, but which cannot
possibly be (in any sane world) the reason it comes out differently., 76
Although not openly overruling established precedent protecting individual
rights, the Roberts Court manipulated technical rules of standing to render
it much more difficult to protect substantive constitutional rights.
Second, in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., the Court
imposed procedural hurdles to make it harder for workers to sue their
employers for unequal pay in violation of Title VII. 77 Ledbetter rejected
the EEOC's longstanding position that, in a disparate pay claim under Title
VII, each inadequate paycheck restarts the clock for statute of limitations
purposes.78 The EEOC's interpretation protects the rights of victims of pay
discrimination who are unaware of their disparate pay for long periods of
time, a common occurrence in the private sector. For example, Lily
Ledbetter did not discover her unequal pay until she was almost sixty years
old and an anonymous note informed her that she had been making
substantially less salary than male co-workers for many years. 79 At the trial
court, Ledbetter prevailed and won both back pay and punitive damages for
the full length of time she received disparate paychecks.80
In a 5-4 decision, the Roberts Court reversed the award in her favor
and held that the statutory limitations period for a disparate pay claim must
be read stringently to require that each claim of unequal pay be filed within
180 days of the unequal paycheck, or the claim would be forfeited. The
75. Interestingly, the challengers attempted to come within the purview of Flast by arguing
that their case was an "as-applied" challenge to general Congressional appropriations statutes.
See id. at 2567 (majority opinion). Justice Alito declared, "Characterizing this case as an "as-
applied" challenge to these general appropriations statutes would stretch the meaning of that term
past its breaking point." Id.
76. Id. at 2573 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) ("Minimalism is an admirable
judicial trait, but not when it comes at the cost of meaningless and disingenuous distinctions that
hold the sure promise of engendering further meaningless and disingenuous distinctions in the
future .... Either Flast was correct, and must be accorded the wide application that it logically
dictates, or it was not, and must be abandoned in its entirety.").
77. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162 (2007).
78. Seeid. at2177n.ll.
79. See Valerie Dowdle, Medill News Service, http://ot&oyez.org/cases/2006/ledbetter-lily-v-
goodyear-tire-rubber-co-05292007 (last visited February 27, 2009).
80. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2166.
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Court justified its "cramped interpretation of Title VII" as a necessary
reading of technical rules provided by the statute.8' The Court's strident
application of procedural rules regarding timely filing of discrimination
lawsuits had the serious substantive consequence of limiting the ability of
victims of pay discrimination to obtain relief.
82
In sum, the Roberts Court's less than coherent approach to as-applied
and facial challenges appears to be yet another example of the Court's
retreat from substantive protection of individual rights, cloaked in
procedural jargon.83 I applaud Borgmann's effort to make more explicit the
connection between the seemingly technical issue of litigation posture and
the protection of substantive rights.84 Borgmann makes an important
contribution to the debate that will inevitably continue regarding facial
challenges by emphasizing the broader impact that disfavoring facial
challenges will have on courts' ability to protect vulnerable populations
and vulnerable rights.85
II. Finessing Facial Challenges-Rights As Remedies
Borgmann convincingly argues that "the Roberts Court's priorities
when addressing rights-infringing laws have been the opposite of what
constitutional norms demand., 86  Borgmann's analysis raises for me a
critical pragmatic question: given the Court's already well-developed
hostility to facial challenges and the likelihood that the composition of the
Court will not shift to a more individual rights-friendly attitude in the near
81. Id. at 2188 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
82. Justice Ginsburg dissented, urging Congress "to correct this Court's parsimonious
reading of Title VII." Id. Congress recently enacted the Lily Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, rejecting
the Roberts Court's narrow reading of Title VII protections. See Lily Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of
2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009).
83. Similar claims of the disingenuous use of "procedural" rulings have been made about the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between
Justiciability and Remedies-And Their Connections To Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REV. 633,
635 n.2, 688-89 (2006) (discussing the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Courts' use of
justiciability doctrines to further policy priorities); Maxwell L. Steams, Standing at the
Crossroads: The Roberts Court in Historical Perspective, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 875, 899
(2008) ("[T]he Burger and Rehnquist Courts redeployed standing to further a different set of
purposes than those motivating the establishment of New Deal standing or than those motivating
the broadening of standing in the Warren Court."). Although this claim is not new, the Roberts
Court seems particularly adept at obscuring its substantive agenda with procedural maneuvers.
84. See generally Borgmann, supra note 2.
85. See generally id.
86. Id. at 589-90.
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future,87 what approach should civil rights litigants take to improve their
chances of success?
Justice O'Connor already suggested one approach in her Ayotte
88opinion. Ayotte essentially finessed the question of the appropriate
standard for reviewing facial challenges as a question of remedy. 89 The
remedy question is deeply intertwined with the as-applied versus facial
challenge question, although the two issues are analytically distinct.90 To
use Borgmann's taxonomy, rather than bringing a pre-enforcement
challenge seeking total invalidation, litigants could bring a pre-enforcement
challenge seeking limited invalidation of a subset of applications of the
statute and frame the suit as an "as-applied" challenge rather than as a
"facial" challenge.91  Although courts and commentators seem rather
confused about the terminology, most courts would consider this challenge
to be "as-applied" rather than "facial. 92  For example, if an abortion
restriction lacks a health exception, perhaps the best way for challengers to
work around Carhart would be to establish as plaintiffs a narrower class of
women with medical need for a health exception and seek an injunction
invalidating the statute "as applied" to those women, in accordance with
severability rules.93 As explained above, Carhart unfortunately forecloses
such an approach to challenging "partial-birth" abortion bans. However,
seeking limited injunctive relief "as-applied" to all women with medical
87. See Tony Mauro, Despite Obama Victory, Will Supreme Court Justices Sit Tight? (Nov.
11, 2008), www.law.com (stating that speculation on Supreme Court retirements all center around
the moderate-liberal wing of the Court, including Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg).
88. See Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 331-32 (2006).
89. See Borgmann, supra note 2, at 576 ("Centering the decision on the remedy, rather than
on the nature of the challenge and what the plaintiff must prove to support it, permitted the
unanimous Court to avoid the divisive question of whether it should apply the Salerno rule in this
abortion case.").
90. See Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules: The Moral Structure of American
Constitutional Law, 97 MICH. L. REv. 1, 158 (1998) (arguing that debate surrounding facial
challenges is essentially a debate about appropriate remedies); Metzger, supra note 13, 887-88
(arguing that difference between facial and as-applied challenges is exaggerated and that key
question is in fact question of statutory severability).
91. Some view suits seeking limited invalidation of a subset of applications as a type of
facial challenge. See Metzger, supra note 13, at 881-82 (stating that "until Salerno uprooted the
traditional orthodoxy, facial challenges were understood to include such context-specific
challenges to general rules because as-applied challenges were defined in fairly narrow terms").
92. See Borgmann, supra note 2, at 569-70; Metzger, supra note 13, at 882 (stating that
post-Salerno, "facial" challenges are defined only as claims seeking total invalidation while "as-
applied" challenges include limited attacks on a statute as unconstitutional in a particular range of
cases as well as fact-based, case-specific challenges).
93. Of course, the court could ultimately decide to invalidate the entire statute if legislative
intent suggests the statute is not severable. See Ayotte, 546 U.S. 320.
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need could work for ensuring that courts mandate health exceptions in
other types of abortion restrictions, such as parental involvement laws or
laws requiring 24-hour waiting periods.
The remedy approach is, however, less than ideal. Seeking limited
injunctive relief rather than pursuing a "facial" challenge urging total
invalidation would be a retreat that may result in less protection for
individual rights.94  Furthermore, as Borgmann argues, the remedy
approach permits legislatures to flout constitutional rights and leave the
courts to clean up their mess. 95 The Ayotte method of finessing the facial
challenge question as a question of what remedy to apply does little to keep
legislatures from "thumb[ing] their nose at the U.S. Constitution" and
forcing the courts to waste resources trying to correct the constitutional
defect.96 Although the remedy approach could provide some protection for
individual rights in an environment hostile to facial challenges, I
wholeheartedly agree with Borgmann that facial challenges, rather than
limited injunctive remedies, are the better means to deter legislative
misconduct and to provide more robust protection of constitutional rights.
Conclusion
The Roberts Court's "as-applied" approach to individual rights
mandates piecemeal litigation that will be more costly for the courts, will
reduce the significance of individual decisions, and, most consequentially,
will "reduce[] the precedential value of Supreme Court decisions regarding
94. For example, this approach will be unlikely to work in the equal protection context
which tends towards "facial" review, i.e., total invalidation or total validation. See Franklin,
supra note 30, at 712-13 (discussing Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 128 S. Ct. 1610
(2008), and arguing that even the proverbial "busload of nuns" are unlikely to win an as-applied
challenge to voter identification law); see also David Gans, supra note 13, at 1353-56 (arguing
that facial challenges are a better means of protecting abortion rights as well as certain other
individual rights). But see Stuart Buck & Mark L. Rienzi, Federal Courts, Overbreadth and
Vagueness: Guiding Principles for Constitutional Challenges to Uninterpreted State Statutes,
2002 UTAH L. REv. 38, 456-61 (2002) (arguing for partial invalidation rather than total
invalidation whenever "a federal court can use a narrow ruling to fully protect individual rights
without imposing on legitimate state activity").
95. See Borgmann, supra note 2, at 598-609.
96. See id. at 610; see also Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 331 (noting the risk that a remedial approach
could provide an incentive for the "legislature [to] set a net large enough to catch all possible
offenders, and leave it to the courts to step inside to announce to whom the statute may be
applied") (internal quotations omitted); Note, After Ayotte: The Need to Defend Abortion Rights
With Renewed "Purpose", 119 HARV. L. REv. 2552, 2563 (2005) (arguing that "it is socially
disadvantageous to raise adjudicative costs for no other purpose than to allow legislators to
express their dissatisfaction with" a particular right).
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laws that infringe important rights., 97 A decision that applies only to the
litigant before the Court fails to safeguard others affected by the same
rights-infringing legislation. All the Roberts Court seems to want to offer
in its constitutional adjudication is a one ticket ride, A la Bush v. Gore.98
However, case-specific adjudication is not how the Court has historically
given effect to constitutional norms, nor does this approach sufficiently
protect fundamental rights.99 The Court's abstract analysis regarding the
appropriate rules for determining whether it should "entertain" as-applied
or facial challenges ignores how these procedural rules affect substantive
rights. Borgmann makes a strong and thoughtful case that courts must
consider the negative impact that denying facial challenges will have both
on the individual rights at stake and on courts' and legislatures' duty to
protect constitutional norms.
97. Borgmann, supra note 2, at 598.
98. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000) ("Our consideration is limited to the present
circumstances"); see also Laurence H. Tribe, Erog v. Hsub and Its Disguises: Freeing Bush v.
Gore From Its Hall of Mirrors, 115 HARv L. REV. 170, 268-73 (2001) (discussing criticism of
Bush v. Gore's attempt to limit its ruling to a "one-way, nonrefundable railroad ticket, good for
this day and this destination only"). Of course, Bush v. Gore is an extreme example, but bears
some similarity to the notion of constitutional adjudication as being almost always as-applied.
See Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1639 ("It is neither our obligation nor within our traditional
institutional role to resolve questions of constitutionality with respect to each potential situation
that might develop . . . [a]s-applied challenges are the basic building blocks of constitutional
adjudication.") (internal quotations omitted).
99. Borgmann, supra note 2, at 598.
Summer 20091
630 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 36:4
